Vietnamese military art in the Ho Chi Minh Campaign

The Ho Chi Minh Campaign in April 1975 was the last campaign in 21 years (1954-1975) of resistance against the US and national salvation in general, and in the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1975 in particular. With the victory of this campaign, the Vietnamese people entered a new era of peace, independence, and unity, and the whole country moved toward socialism.

The victory of the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign demonstrates the unique features of Vietnamese military art. It is the art of proactively creating opportunities, seizing opportunities, attacking quickly, boldly, unexpectedly, achieving complete victory, ending the resistance war.

After American troops and allied troops withdrew from South Vietnam under the Paris Agreement, a new opportunity was created for our army and people to move forward to completely liberate the South. From mid-1973 and especially 1974, the Southern Liberation Army continued to win many victories throughout the Southern areas, including the victory over Thuong Duc (August 1974). Immediately after this victory, in October and December 1974, the Politburo and Central Military Commission together with key battlefield officials met twice to discuss plans to liberate the South. Assessing the revolutionary situation in the South, the Conference affirmed: “We have an opportunity. Twenty years of fighting have created this opportunity, we must know how to seize it to bring the cause of national liberation to complete victory…”. The conference agreed on the strategy to liberate the South in 2 years (1975-1976) and approved the plan to liberate the South. On the other hand, the Conference expected that if the opportunity came, it would immediately liberate the South in 1975. This was a great innovation in the art of directing the preparation of a strategic offensive, ending the war.

While the Conference was continuing to meet, on January 6, 1975, Phuoc Long province was liberated. The Phuoc Long victory opened up new opportunities. The Conference reiterated its intention that if the opportunity came, it would immediately liberate the South in 1975.

According to plan, on March 4, 1975, we launched the Central Highlands Campaign, quickly liberating Buon Ma Thuot and the entire Central Highlands, creating a fundamental change in the comparison of forces and strategic position in favor of Vietnam. us, while the enemy is passive, at risk of strategic collapse and disintegration. This victory opened up the opportunity for a general strategic offensive throughout the South. On March 18, 1975, the Politburo added its determination to a strategy to liberate the South in 1975. Next, on March 25, 1975, right before the liberation of Hue city, the Politburo decided to lower determined to liberate the South before the 1975 rainy season. On March 31, 1975, after Da Nang was liberated, the Politburo decided to liberate the South in April 1975.

Right before Da Nang was liberated, on March 29, 1975, the 15th Conference of the Central Committee of the Southern Department issued a special resolution stating that the strategic opportunity to win complete victory for the liberation of the South had come. The general attack and general uprising has begun. We must quickly, boldly develop and attack in full force to win complete victory with extraordinary efforts “one day equals twenty years”.

On April 1, 1975, based on the rapid development of attacks on the battlefields, the Politburo continued to add strategic determination: to liberate the South as soon as possible, preferably as soon as possible. in April 1975, before the rainy season. In order to concentrate and highly unify the leadership and direction of the key and final decisive battlefield, the Politburo decided to establish the Saigon Front Command and Party Committee, affirming the viewpoint of attacking liberated the South with the extraordinary “one day equals twenty years” efforts of the Central Committee of the Southern Department.

On April 14, 1975, the Politburo decided to name the campaign to liberate Saigon as the Ho Chi Minh Campaign. To focus on the campaign to liberate Saigon, our army mobilized the largest force in the resistance war against the US to save the country, including 4 corps and 1 unit equivalent to a corps, completely overwhelming the enemy army.

Before the Saigon liberation campaign took place, on April 7, 1975, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Minister of National Defense, sent a telegram directing the front with the content: “Speed, even more speed, boldness.” bolder, more daring, taking advantage of every hour, every minute, rushing to the front, liberating the South. Decide to fight and win completely”

Implementing the proposed plan, on April 26, 1975, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign began, with a “speedy and daring” spirit, our troops simultaneously attacked Saigon, where all headquarters of the Government and Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Before the stormy general attack on Saigon by the armies, on April 29, 1975, President of the Republic of Vietnam Duong Van Minh ordered a ceasefire. Upon receiving this news, the Politburo telegram directed the Ministry of Instruction to commander of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign: “continue to attack Saigon as planned; Marching with the most powerful spirit, liberating and occupying the entire city, disarming the enemy army, dissolving the enemy’s government at all levels, and completely crushing all their resistance. Implementing the direction of the Politburo, our troops continued to advance to liberate Saigon, destroy and disintegrate all puppet troops, forcing President Duong Van Minh to declare unconditional surrender. The South was completely liberated.

The 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising that ended with the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign was the pinnacle of military art of the Party, army and people of Vietnam. In particular, strategic determination demonstrates the Party’s sharp strategic thinking; The organization and implementation of military campaigns towards the complete liberation of the South by our army and people is the decisive factor.